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This presentation is a summary of Air Force turbulence-related mishaps
for the last ten years of Air Force mishaps from a perspective of where we
have been, where we are now, and where we are going. In addition to accounts
of major mishaps, a summary of what actions were taken to preclude future
similar mishaps will be presented. Also, a discussion of some of the things
being done now and being planned for the future to prevent turbulence-related
mishaps will be presented.
Before presenting this summary, a short explanation of how mishaps are
classified is in order. The mishaps to be discussed in detail fall into a
Class A category. Class A mishaps are defined as a mishap resulting in:
1. Total cost of $500,000 or more for injury, occupational illness, and
property damage, or
2. A fatality, or permanent total disability, or
3. Destruction of, or damage beyond economical repair to, an Air Force
aircraft.
The DoD as a whole uses pretty much this same system.
The definition of our Class B mishap category is a mishap resulting in:
1. Total cost of $100,000 or more, but less than $500,000, for injury,
occupational illness, and property damage, or
2. A permanent partial disability, or
3. Hospitalization of five or more personnel.
Do not pay much attention to the Class B parameters since none of the Air
Force turbulence-related mishaps fell into this category.
The definition of our Class C mishap category is a mishap resulting in:
1. Total damage which costs $10,000 or more, but less than $100,000
2. Any injury or occupational illness which results in a lost workday
case involving days away from work (i.e., 8 hours or greater), or
3. A mishap which does not meet the criteria above, but which Chapters
5 through 9 require reporting.
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Until January 1, 1986, the dollar limits for Class C damage ranged from $I000
to $I00,000 (the Air Force just recently raised the lower limit to $10,000).
To give a perspective on the size of flight operations during this
study, in 1985 the Air Force has possessed 9,927 active aircraft and flew
3,488,000 flight hours since 1976.
Table I shows the total numbers of Classes A, B, and C mishaps we have
experienced in the last ten years as well as the number of turbulence-related
mishaps which we have experienced by mishap category. From a statistical
point of view, a very small percentage of our mishaps are turbulence related.
However, as shown in Table 2, there is a problem that the Air Force has taken
seriously from actions taken in our Air Force turbulence-related Class A
mishaps.
TABLE 1. Total Air Force Class A, B, and C Mishaps and Turbulence-Related
Mishaps from 1976 to 1985.
CLASSB
782 931 36,729
TURBULENCE RELATED:
CLASSA CLASSB CLASSC
5 0 17
The first turbulence-related Class A mishap in my study occurred when
one of our transport aircraft flew into or near a thunderstorm. The aircraft
had departed home base with weather radar problems. The radar set was
repaired prior to departure but failed again during the flight. Arriving near
their destination, they found that there was significant weather between their
position and their destination base. Civil air traffic control (ATC) advised
them of a temporary radar failure, and that there was pretty solid cover
between them and their destination. Ironically, military radar was tracking
them and the Air Force possesses radar pictures of the weather conditions and
aircraft for this flight. The controller stated, "There's no way I can get
you around it." The aircrew indicated that they were in visual meteorological
conditions (VMC) and would visually circumnavigate the thunderstorms. Two
minutes later, the aircraft failed to respond to a transponder change. The
aircraft broke apart in flight, went out of control, and crashed. Crew
members and passengers perished in the crash. The aircraft had flown close to
thunderstorm cells and, as a result, encountered extreme turbulence which
failed the #4 pylon and right wing.
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A lot of action was generated by this mishap. For example, the weather
radar which had been experiencing a lot of reliability and maintainability
problems was replaced with a muchbetter and more reliable system. The Air
Force cameout with muchmore specific guidance on thunderstorm avoidance in
our basic flight rules. Finally, there was a call for increased research in
the area of severe weather avoidance.
A Multiagency Conference on Severe Convective Storms and Their Hazards
to Aviation was held on February 16 and 17, 1977. A number of agencies were
represented at this conference: National Weather Service, Environmental
Research Labs, National Severe Storms Lab, National Severe Storms Forecast
Center, FAA, NTSB, NASA, Lockheed, University of Chicago, and Air Force
Inspection and Safety Center.
Someof the recommendationsthat cameout of the conference are given in
Table 3. With regards to the first recommendation, a number of studies have
been conducted on thunderstorms by the National Severe Storms Lab and other
agencies. For the second, the Air Force has acquired films on thunderstorm
avoidance and other training aids. The third recommendationwas covered in
our corrective action. The fourth, a test program was established to see if
full-time weather expertise would be useful at Kansas City Air Route Traffic
Control Center. Flight simulation techniques have been developed for
low-level wind shear and are used in Air Force cargo aircraft flight simulator
programs. The last recommendationwascovered in our corrective action.
The second major mishap occurred when a trainer aircraft penetrated a
thunderstorm at high altitude. The mishap pilot accepted a routing from air
traffic control which had more severe weather than what had been forecast for
this flight planned route. Whenthe pilot entered significant weather, he
reported it to ATC. The controller offered the pilot a 180° turn as there
were cells in all quadrants. The pilot received clearance to climb (even
though the aircraft was already out of its engine operating envelope). At
flight level 464, still in the cell, both engines flamed out. The aircraft
traveled 5.4 nautical miles from its last radar painted position to its point
of impact in 2 minutes 9 seconds. It was hypothesized that severe turbulence
within the storm contributed to spatial disorientation and a delayed decision
to eject. The aircraft did not have an on-board weather radar. The mishap
pilot had significant flight experience, including being a graduate of Air
Force Test Pilot School, but let his good Judgmentget side-tracked by intense
motivation to get to his destination. There were no weather-related
corrective actions taken as a result of this mishap.
Our third Class A mishap occurred in 1985 when a forward air controller(FAC) aircraft, encountered turbulence and downdrafts associated with a
mountain wave phenomena. Mountain wave had not been forecast prior to the
mishap flight. A pilot report of severe turbulence was issued by a helicopter
after the mishap aircraft was airborne, but the information was not relayed to
the mishap pilot. It was determined that the mishap aircraft got into an area
of downdrafts which exceeded the aircraft's capability to climb to avoid
terrain. Search for the crash site was hamperedby severe turbulence in the
area.
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As a result of this mishap, a warning was put in the aircraft flight
manual that in even moderate turbulence vertical gust velocities could exceed
the aircraft's climb capabilities.
Less than two months later, another FAC aircraft was lost when it
penetrated severe weather as it attempted to return to base during a weather
recall. The mishap pilot whosevisual routes of escape had been closed off by
weather moving in from all directions decided to climb to 5,000 feet in
instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) so that he could be radar vectored
around the severe weather. During his IMC climb, he encountered a severe
updraft which he interpreted as an attitude indicator failure. He then madea
right descending turn to get back into visual (VMC)conditions. The mishap
pilot then failed to reduce his high-power setting and the aircraft entered a
nose-low, high-speed descent. The left wing failed at approximately 2,500
feet AGL due to high speed and turbulence. The aircraft entered a left
uncontrollable roll and was completely destroyed on impact, fatally injuring
the pilot.
Actions and suggestions coming from this mishap were similar to those of
the other FACaircraft mishaps. A warning regarding the dangers of flying low
to medium performance aircraft in the vicinity of severe updrafts or
downdrafts were recommendedfor Air Force Manual 51-12, "Weather for Aircrew,"
as well as a similar warning for the aircraft flight manual.
Finally, in our last turbulence-related mishap a transport aircraft was
performing a medical evacuation mission into a remote site. Crosswinds on
this approach were high requiring occasional full use of cross controls. A
turbulent downdraft destabilized the aircraft a quarter mile from the runway.
As this was a one-way site, one that requires that you fly your approach in
one direction and your departure in the opposite direction--due to rising
terrain in three quadrants--and they were already past the commit point (the
point past which go-around is improbable), the pilot was committed to land.
The aircraft touched downin a left drift and continued to drift left until it
departed the runway. The aircraft sustained significant damage. There were
no weather-related corrective actions taken as a result of this mishap. This
concludes the look at our Class A turbulence-related mishaps.
Table 4 summarizes the last ten years of Class C turbulence-related
mishaps. A Class C mishap is any damagethat is between $1000 and $100,000.
I will not go into detail on these mishaps unless someonehas a particular
question. Copies of our Class C investigations are not retained except for a
brief narrative summarywhich is put into our computer. If the summary
mentioned that turbulence was forecast, this was noted as a yes or no; if it
was not mentioned, unknown (UNK) was noted. Also, if the airspeeds and
altitudes at which the turbulence was encountered were contained in the
summary, this is noted on the charts.
In reviewing the Class C mishaps, two major trends were noticed. First,
that most of these mishaps occurred in large aircraft and second that most
turbulence-related injuries were sustained by unrestrained occupants. In
talking with fighter aircraft action officers (by the way, I am the C-130
action officer), their commentwas that high-performance aircraft are not
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usually adversely affected by turbulence. Fighter aircraft are built for high
"G" loading, and when they do hit turbulence, crew membersare always well
restrained.
I believe the reason we have a very good record in the area of
turbulence-related mishaps is that our aircrews maintain a high level of
awareness of severe weather. It is a frequent topic in our safety magazines,
it is covered in pilot training, annual instrument refresher training, and
aircrew briefings from our Air Weather Service people. Another factor is that
good weather forecasting keeps us away from severe weather and turbulence.
Some areas where I see improvement for the future in turbulence
avoidance includes better aircraft and ground-based weather radar. NEXRAD,
which should come on line in the early 1990's, will have a turbulence
algorithm. For improved forecasting, the Air Weather Service has recently
completed a geophysical requirement for future turbulence research (defining
Air Force and Army future forecasting needs). It is presently under review at
Air Force Geophysics Labs. Dr. Dale Meyer from Air Weather Service, who was
at this conference, is involved in this effort and has told me that he would
be glad to give any of you who are interested in this geophysical requirement
an overview of the project.
QUESTION:Dave O'Keefe (Lockheed). I noticed in your Class C you had an F105
where the vertical stabilizer broke apart or suffered damage due to
turbulence. Was there any indication that there was a fatigue problem or
there were corrosion problems? Were there any investigations as to why that
stabilizer broke apart?
ANSWER:No, we do not retain copies of our Class C investigations. All I had
to go on was a computer short summary. There were no indications at all of
structural fatigue. The F105 is an old airplane, but it seemsthat if there
had been indications, they would have been mentioned in our findings and they
weren°t.
QUESTION: Capt. Ed Harrison (The Pentagon). As the C130 action officer you
should be well equipped to answer this one. I noticed the Air Force uses
C130's for hurricane and typhoon reconnaissance. I was just curious as to
their weather-related safety record. They are flying directly into the jaws
of danger. Do they have a significant experience with turbulence-related
incidents?
ANSWER:That is a good question. I knowof one C130mishap of a weather C130
flying into a typhoon in the Pacific in 1974. They never found the airplane
so they were never able to determine what exactly caused the failure of the
aircraft.
QUESTION: Mike Tomlinson (Air Weather Service). In your listing of the
factors that you think are involved in a relatively good safety record, a
factor that I didn't see that I think should be there is the need for pretty
tight operational rules that specify when certain levels of turbulence are
forecast. Do you think that is a significant factor, and because you're not
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out there when the forecast calls for severe turbulence, are you less likely
to be exposed to those conditions and have resulting accidents?
ANSWER:Yes, you are. I guess I did fail to mention that as a result of that
1976 C141 accident, they did come up with very specific guidance on
thunderstorm avoidance. And that has, unfortunately, been relaxed since that
time. For a while the Air Force as a whole had a regulation telling you how
far you had to stay away from thunderstorms. You had to be 20 miles downwind
or 10 miles upwind, I don't rememberthe exact parameters. After that, the
fighter community wanted different limitations. That parameter still exists
in military airlift commandsupplement to 60-16, the general flight rules, but
it is not in the Air Force regulation itself. But you're right. It is very
true that we do have a lot of operating restrictions that keep us out of
severe weather.
COMMENT:Dale Meyer (HQAir Weather Service). As was pointed out, I will be
glad to discuss our perspective of Air Force and Army requirements.
QUESTION: George Trevi_o (Michigan Tech). Will photocopies of all these
slides and presentations be madeavailable to the participants?
ANSWER:To answer your question on my briefing in particular, there are parts
of it in which I went into specifics, such as places and types of aircraft,
and they are "For Official Use Only." What I'm going to do is give to the
workshop organization all of my briefing which is not restricted and present a
summarythat won't namethe specific aircraft.
QUESTION:Al Bedard (NOAA). You have a criteria for classifying the strength
of turbulence which I believe dealt with the G forces, if I read that slide
correctly. Is that widely accepted by the defense community or is that your
own internal classification?
ANSWER:That is something I think AWSwould be better at answering.
Dr. Meyer can probably answer that better than I can.
I think
ANSWER:Dale Meyer (HQAir Weather Service). Wedo have a procedure that was
developed by the Air Force Wright Aeronautical Laboratories in 1981 that uses
gust loading to classify all Air Force aircraft into four categories. Weuse
that information operationally in tailoring our forecasts and interpreting
PIREPS. I don't have the details with mebut I have access to them.
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TABLE 2. Air Force Turbulence-Related Class A Mishaps.
TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT IN-FLIGHT BREAKUP; NEAR THUNDERSTORM
TRAINER AIRCRAFT CONTROL LOSS; IN THUNDERSTORM
FORWARD AIR CONTROLLER (FAC) COLLISION WITH THE GROUND DURING MOUNTAIN
WAVE ENCOUNTER
FAC AIRCRAFT IN-FLIGHT BREAKUP IN THUNDERSTORM UPDRAFTS
AND TURBULENCE
TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT RUNWAY DEPARTURE AFTER APPROACH DESTABILIZED
BY TURBULENT DOWNDRAFT
TABLE 3. Multiagency Conference on Severe Convective Storms and Their Hazards to Aviation.
RECOMMENDATIONS
- THE NEED FOR BASIC RESEARCH INTO THE LOCATION, DURATION, AND
INTENSITY OF TURBULENCE IN THE VICINITY OF THUNDERSTORMS
- NEW AIRCREW TRAINING AIDS
- BETTER GROUND-BASED AND AIRBORNE-WEATHER RADAR
- ASSIGNING FULL-TIME WEATHER EXPERTISE IN THE AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROL SYSTEM
- DEVELOP FLIGHT SIMULATION TECHNIQUES WITH REGARD TO LOW-LEVEL
WIND SHEAR
- REVIEW AND STRENGTHEN REGULATIONS AND CRITERIA WITH REGARD TO
PENETRATING HAZARDOUS WEATHER
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TABLE 4. Class C Turbulence-Related Mishaps.
WAS TURBULENCE
FORECAST
1976
T-39A NO
EC-135J UNK
1977
C-130B UNK
B-52G YES/MOD
T-38A UNK
1978
B-52G YES
ALTITUDE/AIRSPEED
FL410/220KIAS
FL310
FL110
HIGH ALT/300 KIAS
FL210/300KIAS
TRAFFIC PATTERN/
DAMAGE
ENGINE FLAMEOUT
CAT CAUSES OSCILLATIONS/FAILUREOF TRAILING
WIRE ANTENNA
CHAIN BOX LATCHES FAIL WHEN A/C ENCOUNTERS
SEVERE TURBULENCE IN CLOUD
SEVERE TURB THROWS CREW VIOLENTLYABOUT
DAMAGE TO LEADING EDGES OF BOTH WINGS AND
VERT STABILIZER WHEN AIRCRAFT ENTERED AREA OF
HEAVY RAIN AND MODERATE TO SEVERE TURBULENCE
DAMAGE TO FLAPS WHEN A/C ENCOUNTEREUMODERATE
TURBULENCE IN RAINSHOWERS
1979
C-130H NO
B-52H YES
EC-135H UNK
1980
C-130A UNK
C-130B NO
1981
C-130A UNK
LOW ALT
UNK
FL330
i000 AGL/125 KIAS
UNKNOWN
FL180/240KIAS
LOADMASTER BREAKS LEG WHEN A/C ENCOUNTERS
SEVERE CAT
MODERATE TURBULENCECAUSED DAMAGE TO BOMB
DOORS, WHILE OPEN
TRAILING WIRE ANTENNA SEPARATESDUE TO CAT
LOADMASTER BREAKS WRIST WHEN A/C ENCOUNTERS
CAT
CREW CHIEF INJURESBACK WHEN A/C ENCOUNTERS
MODERATE CAT
TWO CREWMEMBERS INJURED WHEN A/C ENCOUNTERS
A SEVERE DOWNDRAFT
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TABLE 4. (concluded).
1981
F-IO5D
WAS TURBULENCE
FORECAST ALTITUDE/AIRSPEEDDAMAGE
UNK 1000 FT AGL/
5O0 KIAS
C-130H NO FL160
1982
KC-135
1985
KC-135A
C-130B
YES SO00 MSL
UNK FL220
YES LOW LEVEL
PART UF VERTICAL STABILIZERLOST WHEN A/C
ENCOUNTEREDSEVERE TURBULENCE EN ROUTE TO
RANGE
TWO CREWMEMBERS INJUREDWHEN A/C ENCOUNTERS
ABRUPTSEVERE CAT
PASSENGERINJURED WHEN A/C ENTERS AREA OF
HEAVY WEATHER AND SEVERE TURBULENCE
AIC SUSTAINS CRACKS IN ALL FORWARD ENGINE
MOUNTSWHEN A/C ENCOUNTERSSEVERE TURBU-
LENCE
FIVEAIRCREW SUSTAIN INJURIESWHEN A/C
ENCOUNTERSMOUNTAIN WAVE
25
